The problem of Idealism

When I was a student in philosophy, I was reminded that Thomists were considered "naïve and dogmatic" because of their acceptance of philosophical realism. The charge was uttered because it was said direct realism could not be demonstrated. That is, one could not prove that extra mental reality existed, it could not be proven that the world we inhabit was nothing other than a dream world invented by our minds.

Of course, Descartes was the first modern to question the validity of what the senses told us, and he imagined a "malignus spiritus" constantly deceiving us to believe extra mental reality existed. He placed the burden of proof on the realists, but got trapped in solipsism and did not succeed in getting out. His mind/body dualism simply charted the course of European philosophy. In France, minds lost their bodies. In England, bodies lost their minds.


If one is familiar with the 1999 film The Matrix you will get the computer ages' version of Cartesian philosophy. Instead of a malignus spiritus, we have a malignus supercomputer that deceives our senses into believing external reality is mind independent.


Before giving my own simplistic or rather "dogmatic" critique of this type of idealism, let me describe for students of philosophy the major forms of what is called epistemology (from the Greek etymology meaning "theories of knowledge.") There is a spectrum that runs from idealism to extreme realism

Idealism means that all external reality is mind dependent, or projections of the mind. Major philosophers that embraced this form of epistemology were Malebranche, Berkeley, and Kant (though with some nuance for Kant.)


The next form of epistemology would be indirect realism. Here, the knowers are only in contact with images of real things in external reality. So, similar to when you imagine something, instead of the actual "direct perception" of the thing, you are in contact with second order intentions, or the image of the real thing. John Locke was a proponent of this form of indirect realism.


Then there is what Aristotelians and Thomists ascribe to, and this is called direct realism. Here, the form of the thing is directly perceived and in the knower without the matter. So, when you perceive the chair in front of you, you are directly in contact with it. For Aristotle, there is hierarchy of how we come to know things. First there are the proper sensibles, which are what the senses come directly in contact with. For sight, it is color or differentiated light, for hearing it is sound, and so on. Then there is what is called the "common sensibles." Aquinas relates that this is how we distinguish the white from the sweet. On my understanding, this is also where the immediate sensible "form" resides. Then you have the imagination where images can be produced, and finally the intellect, which is the abode of the universal understanding.

There is also extreme realism, taught by Plato, that holds that the things of our sense experience are merely imperfect participations in their ideal or perfect Forms. These Forms reside in the realm of understanding and are the changeless universals to which all things adhere.


This brief survey is obviously not exhaustive, but is stated here to get a general lay of the land.


So, the modernists call direct realism naïve and dogmatic; naïve because it accepts reality at face value; dogmatic because it does not demonstrate, but just claims things are the way they are. While I can certainly say I am dogmatic about direct realism, it is less about demonstrating mind independent reality for me, and more about the complications idealism brings forth.


The biggest issue I see with it, is that idealism requires there to be actualities presented to my senses that my mind only holds in potency, but these actualities would have to be already actual for me if my mind were projecting. For example, if you asked me to explain the engineering and physics that go into building a stable bridge, or making a plane fly, I would not be able to explain it from a mathematical-scientific perspective. In short, I personally could not build you a bridge or an airplane. Idealism, from this perspective, at least at the naturalist level, is VERY problematic. My mind simply does not have the actualities to project the mathematical foundation for bridges. That is, I need to be taught physics; in an idealistic epistemology, I would be being taught physics that my mind already knew, i.e. learning would be actualizing an already actual, but then why have to work to learn? Why isn't all knowledge angelic in that having the principle, I would already know the conclusions? Idealism basically says that I have knowledge that I do not have, which is a contradiction.


Now, of course, we could argue like Descartes or the writers of the Matrix and imagine a malignant super intellect deceiving at every moment. Is this imagining or creating, however, not a skeptical hypothetical that is fanciful? If direct realists are naïve and dogmatic, then idealists are fanciful and dogmatic. Imagining this demon, however, will run us into the existence of God, for there can be no spirits composed of essence and existence unless there is One Spirit Whose essence is existence. And God is demonstrably good (we'll save this for another post as I know I'm starting to sound like Descartes). So the only way there is a deceiving malignant higher than us super intellect, is if God wills/allows it.


So, ultimately, naturalistic idealism fails on account of placing potency before act and is rounded out in contradiction. We will revisit the malignant spirit or supercomputer in a later post to review if there are problems with a good God allowing deception at every moment.